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The Supreme Court's Opinion
in the Inwood Case:
Declination of Duty*
By KENNETH B. GERMAIN**
INTRODUCTION
In October of 1981, the United States Supreme C6urt
granted certiorari' to consider an issue which had become a rag-
ing controversy2 in the law of unfair trade practices: whether a
drug company that had originated and popularized a prescrip-
tion drug marketed under a particular trademark and sold in
capsule form could enjoin competition from "generic" drug
manufacturers which had carefully copied not only the drug's
unpatented formula but also the capsule's specific color combina-
tion. More particularly, the issue involved whether the "generic"
drug manufacturers' provision of their products to pharmacies
might unlawfully facilitate infringement in the form of passing
off by unscrupulous pharmacists wishing to make special profits.
The passing off is done by charging the higher price attributable
to the branded drug while actually supplying the less expensive
generic equivalent.
Undoubtedly, it was gratifying to trademark-unfair competi-
Copyright © 1982 by Kenneth B. Germain.
Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
1 Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 102 S.Ct. 386 (1981).
2 In broad terms the "controversy" is whether a company selling a "branded" drug
in a capsule having a "distinctive" combination of colors that has obtained a "secondary
meaning" can preclude competition from a generic drug company selling the identical
pharmaceutical formulation put up in a capsule having the same combination of colors.
The following recent cases dealt with this issue: SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Lab-
oratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980); Merrell-National Laboratories, Inc. v. Zen-
ith Laboratories, Inc., 579 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1978); Boehringer Ingelheim G.m.b.h. v.
Pharmadyne Laboratories, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. 1163 (D.N.J. 1980); Hoffman La Roche,
Inc. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. 374 (D.N.J. 1980); A.H.
Robins Co. v. Medicine Chest Corp., 206 U.S.P.Q. 1015 (E.D. Mo. 1980). For a discus-
sion of some of these cases, see Germain, The Thirty-Fourth Year of Administration of the
Lanham TrademarkAct of 1946,71 TRADEMARK REP. 285, 501-08 (1981).
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tion lawyers and academic aficionados alike that the Court
would finally deem it appropriate to review a major case which
combined an intriguing issue of trademark law per se with some
equally intriguing issues involving section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act. in 1967 the Court decided its one and only case under the
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 3-and then only on the relative-
ly peripheral remedial issue of attorneys' fees. 4 Since then, it has
refused to consider many cases of considerable concern involving
a broad range of issues.- However, section 43(a) has been a real
"comer" of late6 despite the Court's steadfast refusal to accept
any cases pertaining to it.7
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,8 the
case that was before the Court, also involved a significant issue of
the law of "product simulation"-an area the Court had entered
into like gangbusters in 19649 and had striven to adjust and rein-
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976 & Supp. 111979).
4 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
5 See, e.g., Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980) (infringement-related goods doctrine); Mushroom
Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d44 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116
(1979) (infringement-related goods doctrine); Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brew-
ing Co., 561 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978) (salvation of "ge-
neric" marks); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976) ("incontestability"); Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmarm
Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 966 (1968) (infringe-
ment-related goods doctrine).
6 See generally Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 4 3(a) of the Lan-
ham Act: You've Come A Long Way, Baby-Too Far, Maybe?, 49 IND. L.J. 84 (1973-74),
reprinted in 64 TRADEMARK REP. 193 (1974); 6 PATENT L. REv. 323 (1974); 13 PUBLISHING,
ENTERTAINMENT, ADvERTISING L.Q. 215 (1974).
7 See, e.g., Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1257 (1982) (necessity for proof of "secondary meaning" in
trade dress cases); International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d
912 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981) (protectability of "aesthetically
functional" jewelry designs); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem
Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975) (protectabil-
ity of cloth insignia "patches"); Fur Information & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E.F. Timme
& Son, 501 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974) (restriction to
misrepresentations concerning "inherent qualities" of goods or services); Colligan v. Activ-
ities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004
(1971) (consumer "standing to sue"); Bernard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d
1279 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970) (actionability of"disparagement").
8 102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982).
9 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compeo Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). These companion cases combined to
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terpret on four occasions 10 while turning away at least one excel-
lent opportunity" for clarification. Suffice it to say, then, that
hopes were dashed when, in June of 1982, the Court resolved the
Inwood Laboratories capsule-colored case on a procedural
ground (bad) and left only scant (worse) and sometimes unsatis-
factory (worst) suggestions regarding the merits of the matter.12
This behavior, in this author's view, constituted a disappointing
"declination of duty" worthy of comment.
I. THE SCENE SET BY THE COURT
Fully one-half of the Court's rather brief opinion was de-
voted to scene-setting, i.e., the statement of the "issue" before
the Court and the history of the lower courts' multiple resolu-
tions of the case. 13 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion started
well enough with a basically sound statement of the crucial "is-
sue
This action requires us to consider the circumstances under
which a manufacturer of a generic drug, designed to duplicate
the appearance of a similar drug marketed by a competitor un-
der a registered trademark, can be held vicariously liable for
infringement of that trademark by pharmacists who dispense
the generic drug.14
hold sweepingly that unpatented, uncopyrighted product "configurations" (i.e., shapes)
could not be protected under state laws of unfair competition, because such laws were pre-
empted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause.
10 See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (state law allowing
enforcement of contractual agreement regarding royalty payments on an unpatented item
not preempted by federal law; Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S.
562 (1977) (state law of "misappropriation" of a performer's "right of publicity" not pre-
empted by federal law; Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (state trade
secret laws not preempted by Federal Patent Act); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546
(1973) (state law prohibiting "tape piracy" of matter not qualifying as "copyrightable"
subject matter under the then-prevailing Copyright Act of 1909 not preempted by federal
law). See generally Germain, Sears/Compco Revisited: May Products and Packages Be
"Simulated"in the Late Seventies?, 1978 AM. PAT. L.A. BULL. 160, 169-170.
11 Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
12 Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 102 S. Ct. at 2182, rev'g
Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981).
13 Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 939 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), af'd, 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979), on remand, 488 F. Supp. 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1980),
rev'd, 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981).
14 102S. Ct. at 2184.
1981-82]
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One shortcoming of this statement is that it inappropriately re-
fers to "vicarious liability," a concept of legal responsibility for
another's tortious conduct because of a pre-existing legal rela-
tionship between the relevant parties. -The Court should have
characterized the issue as "contributory infringement," which is
a term used to indicate an "aiding and abetting" type of behavior
by the party sought to be held liable.15 Another problem is that
the plaintiff, a manufacturer of brand name drugs, admitted
that the defendants' generic drugs were not only similar to its
own product, but actually "bioequivalent," i.e., medicinally
identical. 18
The Court's opinion proceeded to detail the facts of the con-
troversy in the context of modern generic drug substitution laws,
which often permit or require pharmacists to fill prescriptions for
branded drugs with lower-priced generic equivalents. 17 It
pointed out that some manufacturers of generic drugs follow the
"normal industry practice" of expressly touting their goods in
catalogs sent to pharmacists and other professional intermedi-
aries as "equivalent" or "comparable" to adjacently listed
branded drugs.18 In discussing the handling of this case by the
lower courts, the Supreme Court summarized the "contributory
infringement" nature of the plaintiff's claim in the current case:
that the manufacture and sale of pharmaceutically equivalent
drugs in look-alike capsules would facilitate passing off defen-
dant's products to unknowing consumers who thought they were
receiving plaintiff's branded product (CYCLOSPASMOL), and
thus contribute to the infringement of plaintiff's registered trade-
mark.
The Inwood Laboratories case had been brought under the
Lanham Act's basic infringement provision, section 32,19 which
15 Since the Court later referred to the correct theory, both by name and statutory
section, id. at 4594-95, it is clear that the Court understood the nature of the issue before
it.
16 Id. at 4593 n.5.
17 Id. at 4593 n.4 (citing Note, Consumer Protection and Prescription Drugs: The
Generic Drug Substitution Laws, 67 Ky. L.J. 384 (1978-79)).
18 Id. at 4593.
19 Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976), reads in per-
tinent part:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
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includes particular provisions for "contributory infringement" of
the sort alleged (section 32(1)(b)). It also was brought under the
section governing "unfair competition" (section 43(a)),20 on the
basis that the defendants had committed "false designations of
origin" of the source of manufacture of their products by copying
the external appearance of plaintiffs capsules. The plaintiff's
early attempt to attain preliminary injunctive relief was rebuffed
on the joint grounds that the section 32 claim was not supported
by evidence of the requisite "knowing and deliberate instigation"
of infringement and the section 43(a) claim was not supported by
evidence of the color combination's "nonfunctionality" and "sec-
ondary meaning. 21 In affirming this decision, largely because it
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, of-
fering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on
or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered
mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imi-
tation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or adver-
tisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with
the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or ser-
vices on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confu-
sion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided. Under subsection (b) of this section, the registrant shall not be en-
titled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed
with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confu-
sion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
20 Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976), reads:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with
any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false desig-
nation of origin, or any false description or representation, including words
or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall
cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who
shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin or descrip-
tion or representation cause or procure the same to be transported or used in
commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall
be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely
indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated,
or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use
of any such false description or representation.
21 Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 455 F. Supp. 939, 946-51 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), affd, 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979), on remand, 488 F. Supp. 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1980),
rev'd, 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd 102 S. Ct. at 2182.
1681-82.]
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agreed that the record lacked necessary facts, the Second Circuit
advised the district court that the proper test for "contributory
infringement" was broader than the lower court had thought:
[A] manufacturer ... would be liable under § 32 if he sug-
gested, even if only by implication, that a retailer fill a bottle
with the generic capsules and apply [plaintiffs] mark to the
label, or continued to sell capsules containing the generic drug
which facilitated this to a druggist whom he knew or had
reason to know was engaging in the practices just described.2
When the above test was applied at trial on remand, the dis-
trict court found the evidence fell short of the mark on the section
32 claim. 23 It also ruled that the color combination used on plain-
tiffs capsules was not protected under section 43(a) because it
was "functional" (in that it helped patients, pharmacists, and
emergency room personnel to identify the content of the cap-
sules, and in that some elderly patients associated color schemes
with therapeutic effects).2 Moreover, the section 43(a) claim
failed for lack of proof that the color schemes had developed a
"secondary meaning."25 When the Second Circuit reconsidered
the case it reversed 3 on what appeared to be factual grounds of
disagreement with the district court, but without expressly rely-
ing on the well-known "clearly erroneous" rule.-* The Supreme
Court, in turn, reversed3 the Second Circuit on the procedural
issue alone, but managed to perpetuate, and, indeed, exacerbate
some of the major substantive problems inherent in the case.
II. WHAT THE SUPREME COURT DID RESOLVE
The controlling issue in the Supreme Court's opinion, the
22Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 636 (2d Cir. 1979),
aJ'g, 455 F. Supp. 939 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
23 Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 488 F. Supp. 394, 397 (E.D.N.Y.
1980), rev'd, 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. at 2182.
24 Id. at 398-99.
25 Id. at 399-401.
2 Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d at 538. The court reversed
on the section 32 ground only and did not reach the section 43(a) claims.
27 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
28 Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 102 S. Ct. at 2182.
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"clearly erroneous" rule,' is a matter beyond the purview of this
article. However, as a preliminary to its discussion, the Court did
confirm the correctness of the "test" for "contributory infringe-
ment" earlier urged by the Second Circuit:
As the lower courts correctly discerned, liability for trade-
mark infringement can extend beyond those who actually mis-
label goods with the mark of another. Even if a manufacturer
does not directly control others in the chain of distribution, it
can be held responsibile for their infringing activities under
certain circumstances. Thus, if a manufacturer or distributor
intentionally induces another to inftinge a trademark, or if it
continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the
manufacturer is contributorially responsible for any harm
done as a result of the deceit.30
29 The Inwood Court, relying upon Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct. 1781
(1982) and Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969),
noted that the rule "recognizes and rests upon the unique opportunity afforded the trial
court judge to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and to weigh the evidence." 102 S. Ct.
at 2188. In addition, the Court took the Second Circuit to task for reexamining and rede-
ciding a number of purely factual matters already decided by the district court without
claiming-as would have been difficult if not impossible in light of the district judge's
carefully considered analysis-that the resolutions of these matters had been "clearly erro-
neous." Id. at 2188-90. Finally, the Court concluded:
By rejecting the District Court's findings simply because it would have given
more weight to evidence of mislabeling than did the trial court, the Court of
Appeals clearly erred. Determining the weight and credibility of the evi-
dence is the special province of the trier of fact. Because the trial court's
findings concerning the significance of the instances of mislabeling were not
clearly erroneous, they should not have been disturbed.
Id. at 2189.
The Supreme Court's express determination that the trial court's factual findings
had not been "clearly erroneous" drew a critical comment from Justice Rehnquist, who
apparently felt that the question of whether the district judge's findings were "clearly erro-
neous" should have been remanded to the appellate court for consideration under the cor-
rect standard. Id. at 4598 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). More interestingly, Justice White
criticized the Court's opinion on the ground that the "clearly erroneous" rule had not been
presented as a basis for certiorari-except on the issue of "functionality"- and thus should
not have been considered by the Court. Id. at 4596 & n.1 (White, J., concurring). He also
opined that "it is doubtfulin my mind [whether] this fact-bound issue would have war-
ranted certiorari." Id. at 4596. In fact the Court might have derived the "clearly erro-
neous" rationale from the oral argument of the Solicitor General in his role as amicus
curiae. See Drug Color Case Argued Before Supreme Court, 568 PAT. TRADEMARK &
CopyiucmrJ. (BNA) AA-1, AA-2 (Feb. 25, 1982).
30 Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 102 S. Ct. at 2188 (emphasis
1981-82]
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In an interesting footnote,3' Justice O'Connor rejected Justice
White's argument made in his concurring opinion that the Sec-
ond Circuit had "watered down" the appropriate standard for
"contributory infringement" by indicating (in its second opinion)
that defendants would be liable if they" 'could reasonably antici-
pate that their generic drug product would by a substantial num-
ber of druggists be substituted illegally ... ,"'32 Justice O'Con-
nor believed that the Second Circuit had indeed made its deter-
mination on the basis of its originally-stated standard,33 and
noted that the "could reasonably anticipate" approach would
have been erroneous. 34 Justice White, however, was not so will-
ing to exonerate the Second Circuit (or the Supreme Court ma-
jority) and stated emphatically:
The mere fact that a generic drug company can anticipate that
some illegal substitution will occur to some unspecified extent,
and by some unknown pharmacists, should not by itself be a
predicate for contributory liability. I thus am inclined to be-
lieve that the Court silently acquieses [sic] in a significant
change in the test for contributory infringement.-
On this matter a few points are noteworthy. First of all, Jus-
tice White properly accused the other Justices of imperiling the
integrity of the stricter rule since the majority opinion actually
refers to the Second Circuit as having premised its second opinion
upon its belief that defendants "reasonably could have antic-
ipated misconduct by a substantial number of. . .pharma-
cists.... "3 Second, Justice White probably was correct in be-
lieving that the Second Circuit intended a "watered down" rule
since it expressly linked its use of the phrase "could reasonably
anticipate" to its earlier standard by saying that "[the use of look-
added) (citing William B. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526,530-31 (1924);
Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980, 989 (D. Mass. 1946),
aff'd, 162 F.2d 280 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 809 (1947)).
31 Id. at2188 n.13.
32 Id. at 4597 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby
Drug Co., 638 F.2d 538, 543 (2d Cir. 1981)) (emphasis added b Justice White).
33 See the text accompanying note 22 supra for the original test used by the Second
Circuit.
34 50 U.S.L.W. at 4595 n.13.
3 Id. at 2192 (White, J., concurring).
'6 Id. at 2189.
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alike capsules] amounted to a suggestion, at least by implication,
that the druggists take advantage of the opportunity to engage in
such misconduct."37 Third, Justice White-and by implication
Justice O'Connor-was wrong in indicating that existing author-
ities provided no basis for the "could reasonably anticipate" ap-
proach. To the contrary, some of the authorities relied upon by
the Court-" and others 3 not cited refer to this now-discredited
standard. Nevertheless, the Court's clarification-if Justice
O'Connor can be taken at her word-may amount to this: no one
will be considered a "contributory infringer" unless he knowing-
ly creates a particular risk of infringement by a particular inter-
mediary.
III. WHAT THE SUPREME COURT LEFT UNRESOLVED
In general the opinion left the seasoned reader with an un-
37 Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d at 543, quoted in 102 S. Ct.
at 2192 (White, J., concurring).
38 For example, seeds of uncertainty about the proper standard for contributory in-
fringement are contained in the oft-cited Coca-Cola case:
Before he can himself be held as a wrongdoer or contributory infringer one
who supplies another with the instruments by which that other commits a
tort, must be shown to have knowledge that the other will or can reasonably
be expected to commit a tort with the supplied instrument. The test is whe-
ther wrongdoing by the purchaser "might well have been anticipated by the
defendant."
Coca-Cola v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. at 989 (citations omitted) (quoting
Reid, Murdoch & Co. v. H.P. Coffee Co., 48 F.2d 817, 819 (8th Cir. 1931), cert. denied,
284 U.S. 621 (1931)). See note 39 infra for another observation by the court in Reid, Mur-
doch & Co.
Similar seeds exist in Professor McCarthy's treatise in at least two places. Professor
McCarthy states: "If a manufacturer knowingly produces a product with a mark closely
similar to plaintiffs mark, this alone may be held to constitute liability for placing in re-
tailers' hands an instrument of consumer deception." 2 J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIm COMPETITON § 25:2, at 175 (1973). He also notes: "The suppliers liability for his
distributor's wrongful use of a trademarked product turns on whether a reasonable person
in the suppliers position would realize ... that he himself... had produced a situation
which created temptation or an opportunity for wrong.. . ." Id. at 175-76.
39 See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d at 384 ("[I]t is un-
fair competition for a person to put a product into a dealer's hands which a producer can
reasonably anticipate may be easily passed off as the goods of another."); Reid, Murdoch
& Co. v. H.P. Coffee Co., 48 F.2d at 819-20 ("The acts of these retail merchants [in pass-
ing off defendant's goods bearing a particular trademark previously established by another
1981-82]
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easy feeling that the Supreme Court did not have a sound appre-
ciation of the "big picture." For example, why else did the Court
fail to put the Inwood Laboratories case in perspective by refer-
ring to other capsule-color cases?40 In particular the Court's opin-
ion left unresolved two crucial issues in unfair trade laws: 4' the
modern status of the Sears-Compco doctrine and the proper role
of section 43(a) in unfair competition claims. Additionally, the
Court failed to address the issue of the availability and scope of
the "functionality" defense in either of these two areas.
The Sears-Compco doctrine, derived from the Supreme
Court's two 1964 landmark cases holding that federal law pre-
empts certain state unfair competition laws,4 has been discussed
and debated since the Court pronounced 43 the doctrine until the
present. 44 Incredibly, in the Inwood Laboratories case, which in-
volved product simulation by duplication of medicinal formula,
capsule colors and configuration, the Court relegated the doc-
trine to one passing comment and citation in a scant footnote on
"functionality." 45 Such treatment, which breeds disrespect for
the doctrine at best and suggests that it is doomed at worst, can-
not be explained away on the basis that the lower court opinions
and briefs to the Court did not illuminate this aspect of the con-
company] might well have been anticipated by the defendant."); RSTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 713 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963) ("One falsely markets goods or services if,
though making no false representation himself, he acts in a manner which he knows is
likely to invite his purchasers to market them as those of another.").
40 See note 2 supra for cases dealing with the capsule-color issue.
41 A third matter was left totally untouched but for a fleeting remark in Justice
Whites concurrence: "[Tihe purpose of the Lanham Act was to codify and unify the com-
mon law of unfair competition and trademark protection." Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v.
Ives Laboratories, Inc., 102 S. Ct. at 2191. The relative obscurity of this brief reference is
ironically advantageous since the remark indicates an unduly narrow view of the Act,
which contains a crucial section providing for nationwide constructive notice of all Princi-
pal Register registration, Lanham Act § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1976), plus some other sta-
tutory benefits resulting from registration.
42 See note 8 supra for a discussion of the holdings in Sears and Compco.
43 See, e.g., Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?, 64 COLtM. L. REv. 1178
1964).
44 See, e.g., Dannay, The Sears-Compco Doctrine Today: Trademarks and Unfair
Competition, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 132 (1977); Note, The Problem of Functional Features:
Trade Dress Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLuM. L. REv. 77,
82-85 (1982).
45 Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 102 S. Ct. at 2186 n.10.
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troversy; 46 on the contrary, the briefs and opinions directly ad-
dressed the pivotal problems. Indeed, the Court may have de-
creed the demise of the doctrine in the last paragraph of Justice
O'Connor's opinion:
Although the District Court also dismissed [plaintiff's]
claims alleging that the [defendants] violated § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act and the state unfair competition law, the Court of
Appeals did not address those claims. Because § 43(a) prohibits
a broader range of practices than does § 32, as may the state
unfair competition law, the District Court's decision dismiss-
ing [plaintiffs] claim based upon those statutes must be inde-
pendently reviewed.47
Such pointed references to the availability of state law underline
the disabled-or moot-status of the Sears-Compco doctrine. It
is submitted that a major doctrine, when no longer considered
useful-perhaps because of a change in judicial personnel48-
should not be allowed merely to drift off into oblivion, leaving
practitioners and others to speculate as to its disappearance.
As to the "functionality" issue, which has been a thorny mat-
ter for years,49 Justice O'Connor's opinion only made an incon-
clusive, cryptic reference. "Functionality" involves the question
of whether a product feature is "functional" and therefore un-
46 See Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 455 F. Supp. at 945, 947-49, Su-
preme Court Urged to Preclude Exclusive Rights in Drug Colors, 557 PAT. TRADEMARK &
CoPYEicHT J. (BNA) A-5 (Dec. 3, 1981) (summarizing petitioners' brief to the Supreme
Court); Supreme Court Urged to Endorse Exclusive Rights in Drug Colors, 562 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPrMcHT J. (BNA) A-2, A-3 (Jan. 14, 1982) (summarizing respondents
brief to the Supreme Court).
47 Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 102 S. Ct. at 2190 (emphasis
added). Accord id. at 4598 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("I agree with the Court that the
case should be remanded to the Court of Appeals to review the District Court's dismissal of
[plaintiffs] claims under § 43(a) . . . and itsstate law claims." (emphasis added)).
48 The only Justices on the 1982 Court who were also on the 1964 Court are Justices
Brennan, Stewart, and White. Interestingly, in the current case, Justice White is the only
one who comes anywhere near acknowledging the Sears-Compco heritage. See id. at
2192-93 (White, J., concurring) (discussion of "functionality").
49 See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Keene Corp.
v. Paraflex Industries, Inc., 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981); Pagliero v. Wallace China Co.,
198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952); In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A.
1961); Note, Unfair Competition and the Doctrine of Functionality, 64 COLuM. L. REv.
544(1964).
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protectible (under both the Sears-Compco doctrine and pre-
existing caselaw) or "nonfunctional" and therefore eligible for
protection via secondary meaning (under caselaw antedating the
Sears-Compco doctrine, under section 43(a), or, apparently,
after the current case under state law). Justice O'Connor merely
wrote in a footnote:
While the doctrine of functionality is most directly related to
the question of whether a defendant has violated §
43(a) .. .a finding of functionality may also be relevant to an
action involving § 32. By establishing... that uniform cap-
sule colors served a functional purpose, the [defendants] of-
fered a legitimate reason for producing an imitative product. °
Suffice it to say that the Court underemphasized the major role
that "functionality" plays in the registration context51 and ig-
nored its effect under state law. (Some worthy food for thought
does, however, appear in Justice White's concurring opinion.)52
The other crucial area left foggy by the Court concerns sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Here the major questions53 include
50 Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 102 S. Ct. at 2190. One
writer cites, but rejects its theories. See Note, The Problem of Functional Features: Trade
Dress Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 CoLtUM. L. REv. 77 (1982).
5 See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. 9 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re
Water Gremlin Co., 635 F.2d 841 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
52 It is my view that a finding of functionality offers a complete affirmative de-
fense to a contributory infringement claim predicated solely on the reproduc-
tion of a functional attribute of the product. A functional characteristic is "an
important ingredient in the commercial success of the product," ... and,
after expiration of a patent, it is no more the property of the originator than
the product itself .... Reproduction of a functional attribute is legitimate
competitive activity.
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 102 S. Ct. at 2192-93 (quoting from
Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d at 643). The Second Circuit decision
in turn was quoting, via intermediate cases, from Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198
F.2d at 343. This approach is, of course, reminiscent of the Sears-Compco doctrine. Note,
however, that Ninth Circuit law was reinterpreted in the recent case of Vuitton et Fils
S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981).
53 The Court assumed the § 43(a) phrase "false designation of origin" goes beyond
geographical origin to include origin of manufacture as was held years ago in the leading
case of Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963). The
Court raised no issue about it and Justice White spoke approvingly of this interpretation.
See Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 102 S. Ct. at 2193 (White, J.,
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the appropriate breadth of application of that section and the ef-
fect of the "functionality" concept on section 43(a) protection.
With regard to the former, the Court willingly waxed ("§ 43(a)
prohibits a broader range of practices than does § 32 ... ."),54
and Justice White agreed.-s This is all well and good, but is this
the best that the Court can do with a major statutory provision
about which it has said nothing for thirty-five years? The latter
matter of "functionality" was referred to by the Court only in a
footnote mentioned earlier in this article.56 Justice White, how-
ever, did provide a concise but helpful discussion, correctly con-
cluding that section 43(a) cases were just as susceptible to the
functionality defense as section 32 cases.57 It is unfortunate that
this view-expanded and analyzed-was not made part of the
majority opinion.
CONCLUSION
The Inwood Laboratories capsule-color case offered the Su-
preme Court a major controversy replete with important issues,
but the Court decided only a minor part of it-and that not very
well. One can only hope that the Court will soon entertain
another case raising some of the same issues, but this time accord
them the attention they truly deserve.
concurring). For a recent case calling this interpretation into question, but ultimately ac-
ceding due to its precedents, see Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups,
Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 700-02 (5th Cir. 1981).
54 Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 102 S. Ct. at 2190.
'5 "As the Court of Appeals noted in [the first appeal], § 43(a) 'goes beyond § 32 in
making certain types of unfair competition federal statutory torts'...." Id. at 4598
(White, J., concurring) (quoting Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d at
641).
6 See the text accompanying note 49 supra for a part of the majority's discussion of
functionality.
57 I am also mindful that functionality is a defense to a suit under §
43(a) ... alleging damages to a competitors "false designation of origin" on
a good .. . .It would be anomalous for the imitation of a functional feature
to constitute contributory infringement for purposes of § 32, while the same
activity is not a "false designation of origin" under § 43(a).
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 102 S. Ct. at 2193 (White, J., con-
curring) (citations omitted). Note that Justice White included a caveat: "This is not to sug-
gest that the copying of a functional feature protects a defendant from § 32 liability predi-
cated on active inducement of trademark infringement or protects a defendant who has




Since the completion of the body of this article, a number of
noteworthy developments have occurred. First, in a very brief
order bearing a warning that it was not to be cited or relied upon
as precedent,-, the two Second Circuit judges that formed the
majority in the second appeal totally rejected the Supreme
Court's invitation to reconsider the case with regard to section
43(a) and state unfair competition law principles. The following
rather meager explanation was offered:
We affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing the
other claims, substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Nic-
kerson in his April 15, 1980, decision, which is predicated
upon his findings that the color and shape of defendants' ge-
neric cyclandelate look-alike capsules serve functional pur-
poses (e.g., therapeutic effect and identification) and that Ives"
trademarked capsules had not acquired a secondary meaning
creating the likelihood that it might be perceived as the source
of the product. See American Footwear Corp. v. General Foot-
wear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 664 (2d Cir. 1979). We cannot label
these findings clearly erroneous. See Inwood Laboratories,
Inc., et al v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., --U.S.--, 50 U.S.L.W. at
4596 n.20. For the same reasons the dismissal of the state law
unfair competition claims must stand. 9
About one month later a "petition for rehearing with suggestion
for a rehearing en banc' was denied without opinion.61
Second, since the Supreme Court's decision, two federal dis-
trict court decisions on the capsule-color controversy have been
issued. 6' Intriguingly, in both of these cases state unfair competi-
58 Ives Laboratories, Inc., v. Darby Drug Co., No. 80-7314, slip op. at 1 (nota bene)
(2d Cir. July 7,1982) (partially reprinted in 24 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) at
412). The court stated: "Since this statement does not constitute a formal opinion of this
court and is not uniformly available to all parties, it shall not be reported, cited or other-
wise used in unrelated cases before this or any other court." No. 80-7314, slip op. at 1.
59 Id. at 2.
60 Telephone interview with Marie Driscoll, counsel for Ives Laboratories, Inc.
(Sept. 13, 1982).
61 American Home Products v. Chelsea Laboratories, No. 81-3351 (D.N.J. Aug. 5,
1981) (memorandum) (summarized in 24 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) at
413); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., No. 82-788 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 1982)
(summarized in 24 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) at 414).
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tion law was successfully invoked and yet virtually no consider-
ation was accorded to whether there was a conflict with the
Sears-Compco doctrine. In fact, one of the cases contains a quick
statement to the contrary.62 That same case viewed the Supreme
Court's decision as having "no application here," stating that it
was only a procedural ("clearly erroneous" rule) decision 3 The
other district court case likewise viewed Inwood as limited to
procedural matter,64 and specifically stated that it "does not over-
rule SK&F [Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc.]
with respect to the nonfunctionality of drug trade dress," 6 and
further that "[n]othing in [Inwood] precludes this court from
evaluating the relevant evidence and concluding that the trade
dress here in issue is nonfunctional." This case also directly held
that because the Supreme Court expressly restricted its opinion in
Inwood to section 32 situations, then the "reasonable anticipa-
tion" standard applied by the Third Circuit in the section 43(a)
state law SK&F case was still viable in that context. 7 Thus, it is
apparent that the immediate reactions to Inwood by lower fed-
eral courts have been to view it very narrowly indeed.68
62 In American Home Products, the court stated: "There is nothing in these regula-
tory laws, federal or state, which in any way modifies or reduces the scope of the law of
trademarks or unfair competition in the case of prescription medications." No. 81-3351,
slip op. at 7.
63 Id. at 12.
64 No. 82-758, slip op. at 30.
6 Id. at 31.6 6 Id.
67 See id. at 36.
8 For the reactions of a number of well-versed trademark lawyers to the Inwood
case (along with excerpts from various briefs, etc.), see 72 TRADE-MARK REP. 1-141 (1982).
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